Browsing by Autor "Everaldo Lamprea"

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Colombia's Right-to-Health Litigation in a Context of Health Care Reform
(Cambridge University Press, 2014) Everaldo Lamprea
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Evaluating essential health packages from a human rights perspective
(Taylor & Francis, 2015) Audrey R. Chapman; Lisa Forman; Everaldo Lamprea
Many countries at all levels of development have formulated an essential health package, sometimes also referred to as a health benefit plan or a health benefit basket. As defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), essential health packages (EHPs) are “health service interventions that are considered important and that society decides should be provided to everyone.” Although EHPs are not often formulated from an explicitly human rights perspective, since they are conceptualized as a guaranteed minimum of health services, much like core health obligations, they have obvious human rights import. This article evaluates the principles from which the plans are developed, the content of the packages, and the experience of countries seeking to implement them from a human rights perspective. In the process, it seeks to gain greater clarity about the health service requirements of the right to health.
Medio ambiente y acciones populares en Colombia: un estudio empírico
(2017) Angela M. Páez; Everaldo Lamprea; Catalina Vallejo Piedrahíta
<p>Este artículo presenta los resultados de un estudio empírico que sistematizó las acciones populares falladas por el Consejo de Estado colombiano durante un<br />período de 17 años (1998-2015). Los autores utilizaron metodologías de análisis cuantitativo y cualitativo para sistematizar más de 250 fallos de acciones populares decididas por el Consejo de Estado. Los resultados presentados en este artículo muestran las tendencias más importantes del litigio de acciones populares ambientales en Colombia: tipos de demandantes y demandados; tipo de recursos medioambientales protegidos; tasas de éxito de los demandantes; regiones y ciudades más litigiosas; efectos generales del incentivo económico en el tipo de litigio, entre otras variables. Los resultados de este estudio también muestran que el incentivo económico para las acciones populares no estaba favoreciendo los intereses de litigantes temerarios, como lo sostuvo el gobierno nacional cuando propuso al Congreso una reforma a las acciones populares, que se concretó en la Ley 1425 de 2010. Finalmente, se sugiere que la eliminación del incentivo económico de las acciones populares puede tener un efecto negativo sobre el litigio de interés público.</p>
When Accountability Meets Judicial Independence: A Case Study of the Colombian Constitutional Court's Nominations
(De Gruyter, 2010) Everaldo Lamprea
In 1991, Colombia established a Constitutional Court with expansive powers to protect rights. The power to nominate members of the Court was placed in the hands of the President along with the Supreme Court and Administrative Court. In 2008, fourteen Colombian NGOs formed the Elección Visible, a coalition designed to ensure greater accountability in Constitutional Court nominations by the two higher courts and by the President. In this study I explore the roots of the resulting clash between the Elección Visible and the nominating courts. In my study I concentrated on the nomination process that took place at the Supreme and Administrative Courts, since President Uribe flatly ignored the NGOs demands for more accountability in the nomination process and kept his nomination picks concealed until the very last minute. I show that the conflict between nominating Courts and the NGOs arose when NGO demands for accountability through a more transparent nomination process were resisted by the nominating courts in the name of judicial independence. Moreover, I show that Administrative and Supreme Court's Justices decide whom to nominate according to subjective, political, ideological and personal criteria. In particular, I argue that the Administrative Court relies on a traditional liberal/conservative dichotomy in making its Constitutional Courts nominations, while the judgments of the Supreme Court rely heavily on assessments of loyalty towards the Supreme Court once the candidate is appointed to the Constitutional Court. The cost of admitting these hidden" nomination criteria publicly in a legal system such as the Colombian still highly formalistic and based on a model of Judge who adjudicates based only on the law" is far too high. Therefore, Justices had strong incentives to conceal the real" nomination criteria from the efforts by Elección Visible to ensure greater transparency.