Browsing by Autor "Gover Barja Daza"

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Bolivia: Impact of Shocks and Poverty Policy on Household Welfare
(Universidad Católica Boliviana San Pablo, 2006) Gover Barja Daza; Javier Monterrey Arce; Sergio Villarroel Bohrt
This paper evaluates the short term impacts on poverty of pro-poor expenditure and total social expenditure during the 1998-2002 period of Bolivian economic recession. Observed characteristics of recession are simulated by the combined effects of negative terms of trade shock, reduction in foreign saving flows and low output growth. Evaluation is performed by simulating the impacts of shocks and social expenditures in an environment of low growth: i) on macro aggregates of consumption, income, saving and prices (based on a simple static 1-2-3 model), ii) on household income and consumption levels, and iii) on consumption based poverty indicators. The following were main results from experiments:The terms of trade shock had greater negative impact on household income then reduction in foreign saving flows. In contrast, reduction in foreign saving flows had greater negative impact on household consumption then the terms of trade shock. The head count ratio has been greater from reduction in foreign saving flows then from the terms of trade shock. Poverty gap and poverty intensity has concentrated in rural areas, being greater from reduction in foreign saving flows then from the terms of trade shock.The combined positive effects from observed social expenditure policy and effort in an environment of low output growth, did not compensate the combined negative impacts from the experienced terms of trade shock and reduction in foreign saving flows.These conclusions show that under macroeconomic disequilibrium poverty reduction efforts become policies of poverty containment or safety net programs. Poverty reduction is a long term objective that requires long term commitment for an environment on macroeconomic stability.
Disminución de precios de commodities en un ambiente de 'enfermedad holandesa' y 'bendición/maldición de los recursos naturales'
(Universidad Católica Boliviana San Pablo, 2016) Gover Barja Daza; David Zavaleta Castellón
Se utiliza un modelo de Equilibrio General Computable para analizar los impactos externos a los precios de los commodities, en el contexto de un país (Bolivia) abundante en recursos naturales, con dos sectores orientados a la exportación de recursos naturales (gas natural y petróleo y minerales), además de otros dos sectores emergentes de productos transables (alimentos y manufacturas básicas), con una orientación dominante hacia la sustitución de importaciones. El objetivo es estudiar cómo cambió la estructura económica de Bolivia en un periodo de altos precios internacionales de sus recursos naturales y anticipar cómo tendría que ajustarse dicha estructura en un nuevo periodo de menores precios internacionales. ¿Bajo qué condiciones se revertirá el periodo de auge? ¿Está Bolivia preparada?.
Institutional Design and Implicit Incentives in Bolivia's Decentralization Model
(Universidad Católica Boliviana San Pablo, 2013) Gover Barja Daza; Sergio Villarroel Böhrt; David Zavaleta Castellón
The second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) approach is used as a reference to analyze the political and fiscal institutional design of Bolivia’s decentralization model and its evolution. Subnational public finance data up to 2008 is used to verify that decentralization of expenditure was higher than that of revenue, establishing a context of vertical fiscal imbalance that increased due to growing fiscal transfers during the positive external shock (boom) period. Consequently, the subnational fiscal surplus was not a result of internal efficiency but of excess revenues from such transfers. Panel models were estimated to identify and assess the implicit incentives embedded in fiscal institutions of the decentralization model.Findings at the municipal level are: i) misalignment of local spending with local interests due to dominance of transfers over own revenue (dominance of central government development policies); ii) incentive to spend transfers faster than own revenue (flypaper effect); iii) greater marginal contribution of own revenue to positive fiscal balances compared to transfers, thus introducing the seed for a soft budget constraint but hidden by the fiscal surplus; iv) disincentive to generate own revenue (tax and non-tax) due to the size and growth of transfers (disincentive to the culture of contributing to own revenue). Findings at the prefectural level are: i) misalignment with regional interests given the dominance of transfers over own revenue due to absolute lack of tax powers (until 2009); ii) high tendency to a soft budget constraint and, eventually, also fiscal bail-out, hidden by the fiscal surplus; iii) in only two departments collection of national-level taxes were higher, compared to transfers received in the same departments; iv) disincentive to pay the VAT (national-level tax) due to higher royalty transfers received, an effect not extended to other national-level taxes; v) high dependence from hydrocarbon-based transfers, and fiscal risk when this natural resource declines (both in volume and prices) due to volatility of international oil prices. Also, as a result of the decentralization model a positive and significant impact was found on education-coverage indicators, an important development objective of the national government.