Browsing by Autor "Gustavo Duncan"

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El uso del DEA para la estimación del factor X en la definición de tarifas portuarias
(Universidad de Los Andes, 2008) Gustavo Duncan
The X factor in price cap systems is useful to identify the inefficiencies of the costs of port services. However its determination can be controversial and rife with risks due to the asymmetry of information. In this article, a model is proposed to set the X factor with the maximum tariff schema based on the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). With this tool it is possible to estimate the efficiency rate of the different elements of a group of decision units by comparing their supply levels and visible products for the State regulatory agency. In the case of port infrastructure it is possible to analyze the efficiency of the technology and the time investment of the ports according to declared costs, so that the efficient ports can have their costs approved, while the rest would have their costs reduced according to their efficiency rate.
Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance
(2021) Christopher Blattman; Benjamin Lessing; Santiago Tobón; Gustavo Duncan
Criminal groups govern millions worldwide. Even in strong states, gangs resolve disputes and provide security. Why do these duopolies of coercion emerge? Often, gangs fill vacuums of official power, suggesting that increasing state presence should crowd out criminal governance. We show, however, that state and gang rule are sometimes complements. In particular, gangs could minimize seizures and arrests by keeping neighborhoods orderly and loyal. If true, increasing state presence could increase incentives for gang rule. In Medellín, Colombia, criminal leaders told us they rule to protect drug rents from police. We test gang responses to state presence using a geographic discontinuity. Internal border changes in 1987 assigned blocks to be closer or further from state security for three decades. Gangs exogenously closer to state presence developed more governance over time. They primarily did so in neighborhoods with the greatest potential drug rents. This suggests new strategies for countering criminal governance.
Statebuilding in the City: An Experiment in Civilian Alternatives to Policing
(2022) Christopher Blattman; Gustavo Duncan; Benjamin Lessing; Santiago Tobón
State penetration varies widely within cities, with well-governed areas abutting persistently neglected ones. Governments are seeking ways to improve penetration, local security, and state legitimacy. We experimentally evaluate a 20-month non-police intervention in Medellín, Colombia, that dramatically increased municipal personnel and agency attention to 40 neighborhoods. Despite the intensity, average impacts on security and perceived legitimacy were negligible. Prespecified subgroup analysis reveals important heterogeneity, however. Where state governance began relatively lower, impacts were null to negative, but in initially high-governance sectors, security and state legitimacy significantly improved. These divergent impacts apparently resulted from city staff and agencies systematically underdelivering in low-initial-governance sectors. Bureaucratic capacity and incentives to deliver often depend on baseline state engagement, trust, and accountability. This could result in increasing marginal returns to statebuilding, which in turn would lead to persistent "neglect traps"—political attention and investment where state presence is already robust, reinforcing existing disparities.
Una lectura política de Pablo Escobar
(EAFIT University, 2013) Gustavo Duncan
Este artículo es una aproximación al carácter político de las mafias que protegen el tráfico de drogas desde una perspectiva mencionada pero poco tratada dentro del concepto mismo de mafia: la articulación de intereses de amplios grupos sociales dentro de su oferta de protección. Tanto las mafias de la droga que gozan de dominación social como las que no tienen mayor interacción social toman decisiones dirigidas a la imposición de sus intereses. La gran diferencia está en que las decisiones de las primeras tienden a involucrar la estructura social que ha sido transformada por el narcotráfico. Cualquier intento por reprimir a las mafias involucra ahora un ataque a los intereses estructurales de amplios sectores sociales. Un caso concreto servirá para ilustrar esta lectura política del narcotráfico: la guerra de Pablo Escobar contra el estado.