Browsing by Autor "James A. Robinson"

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Endogenous Presidentialism
(2008) James A. Robinson; Ragnar Torvik
We develop a model to understand the incidence of presidential and parliamentary institutions.Our analysis is predicated on two ideas: first, that minorities are relatively powerful in a parliamentary system compared to a presidential system, and second, that presidents have more power with respect to their own coalition than prime ministers do.These assumptions imply that while presidentialism has separation of powers, it does not necessarily have more checks and balances than parliamentarism.We show that presidentialism implies greater rent extraction and lower provision of public goods than parliamentarism.Moreover, political leaders who prefer presidentialism may be supported by their own coalition if they fear losing agenda setting power to another group.We argue that the model is consistent with a great deal of qualitative information about presidentialism in Africa and Latin America.
Fear and Dreams: Understanding the Non-Institutional Sources of Leader Strategy
(RELX Group (Netherlands), 2024) María Angélica Bautista; Juan Sebastián Galán; James A. Robinson; Rafael Torres; Ragnar Torvik
He Who Counts Elects: Economic Elites, Political Elites, and Electoral Fraud
(Wiley, 2014) Isaías N. Chaves; Leopoldo Fergusson; James A. Robinson
What determines the extent of electoral fraud? This paper constructs a model of the tradeoff between fraud and policy concessions (public good provision) which also incorporates the strength of the state. In addition, we parameterize the extent to which economic elites (to whom fraud is costly) and political elites (to whom fraud is advantageous) “overlap.” The model predicts that fraud will be lower and public good provision higher when land inequality is higher, the overlap between elites lower, and the strength of the state higher. We test these predictions using a unique, municipal‐level dataset from Colombia's 1922 Presidential elections. We find empirical support for all the predictions of the model.
<span>Fear and Dreams: Understanding the Non-Institutional Sources of Leader Strategy</span>
(RELX Group (Netherlands), 2024) María Angélica Bautista; Juan Sebastián Galán; James A. Robinson; Rafael Torres; Ragnar Torvik
The interaction of economic and political inequality in Latin America: a view from Colombia
(Oxford University Press, 2025) Leopoldo Fergusson; James A. Robinson; Santiago Torres
Abstract We investigate how economic inequality can persist in Latin America in the context of radical falls in political inequality in the last decades. Using data from Colombia, we focus on a critical facet of democratization—the entry of new politicians. We show that initial levels of inequality play a significant role in determining the impact of political entry on local institutions, policy and development outcomes, which can impact future inequality. A vicious circle emerges whereby policies that reduce inequality are less likely to be adopted and implemented in places with relatively high inequality. We present evidence that this is caused both by the capture of new politicians and barriers to institution and state capacity building and by the fact that politicians committed to redistribution are less likely to win in relatively unequal places. Our results, therefore, help to reconcile the persistence of economic inequality with the new political context.
The Need for Enemies
(Oxford University Press, 2014) Leopoldo Fergusson; James A. Robinson; Ragnar Torvik; Juan F. Vargas
We develop a model where some politicians have an edge in undertaking a task and this gives them electoral advantage, creating an incentive to underperform in the task. We test the empirical implications in the context of fighting against insurgents, using Colombian data. The main prediction is that large defeats for the insurgents reduce the probability that these politicians fight them, especially in electorally salient places. We find that after the largest victories against FARC rebels, the government reduced its counterinsurgency efforts, especially in politically important municipalities. Politicians need to keep enemies alive in order to maintain their political advantage.
The Weak State Trap
(Wiley, 2020) Leopoldo Fergusson; Carlos Molina; James A. Robinson
The Weak State Trap
(2020) Leopoldo Fergusson; Carlos Molina; James A. Robinson
Development outcomes come in 'clusters' that seem difficult to exit.Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism.State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to flourish.Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity.We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the micro level.We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing influences.Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops.Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit.