Browsing by Autor "Mounu Prem"

Now showing 1 - 4 of 4

Replication Data for: The Rise and Persistence of Illegal Crops: Evidence from a Naive Policy Announcement
(Harvard University, 2021) Mounu Prem; Juan F. Vargas; Daniel Mejía
Prem, Mounu, Vargas, Juan F., and Mejía, Daniel, (2023) “The Rise and Persistence of Illegal Crops: Evidence from a Naive Policy Announcement.” Review of Economics and Statistics 105:2, 344–358.
The Limits of Hegemony: U.S. Banks and Chilean Firms in the Cold War
(2022) Felipe Aldunate; Felipe González; Mounu Prem
Governments in hegemonic states use economic sanctions to induce changes in other countries. What happens to international business networks when these sanctions are in place? We use new historical firm-level data to document the destruction of financial relations between U.S. banks and Chilean firms after socialist Salvador Allende took office in 1970. Business reports and stock prices suggest that firms were mostly unaffected by having fewer links with U.S. banks. Substitution of financial relations towards domestic banks appears to be the key mechanism explaining these findings.
The Rise and Persistence of Illegal Crops: Evidence from a Naive Policy Announcement
(The MIT Press, 2021) Mounu Prem; Juan F. Vargas; Daniel Mejía
Abstract Policies based on prohibition and repression to fight the war on drugs have largely failed in a variety of contexts. However, incentive-based policies may also fail and have unintended negative consequences if policymakers do not properly anticipate behavioral reactions. This is an particularly important concern in the case of policies announced prior to their implementation. In this paper, we show that a naive and untimely policy announcement generated an unprecedented escalation in cocaine production in Colombia, offsetting almost 20 years and billions of dollars of U.S.-backed efforts to stop drug production and cartel action.
The Rise and Persistence of Illegal Crops: Evidence from a Naive Policy Announcement
(2020) Mounu Prem; Juan F. Vargas; Daniel Mejía
Policies based on prohibition and repression to fight the war on drugs have largely failed in a variety of contexts. However, incentive-based policies may also fail and have unintended negative consequences if policymakers do not properly anticipate behavioral reactions. This is a particularly important concern in the case of policies announced prior to their implementation. In this paper, we show that a naive and untimely policy announcement generated an unprecedented escalation in cocaine production in Colombia, offsetting almost 20 years and billions of dollars of U.S.-backed efforts to stop drug production and cartel action.