Browsing by Autor "Oskar Nupia"

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Cuarentena y post cuarentena en Colombia: preocupaciones económicas, aislamiento social y aprobación del gobierno
(Elsevier BV, 2021) Oskar Nupia
Usamos datos de Colombia para analizar preocupaciones económicas personales y sociales generadas por la COVID-19, el cumplimiento del aislamiento y la aprobación del gobierno, antes y después de la cuarentena. En post-cuarentena las preocupaciones personales aumentaron, mientras las sociales disminuyeron. Un alto porcentaje de personas reportan ambas preocupaciones. El cumplimiento de la cuarentena aumentó, pero la aprobación del gobierno disminuyó. Usando regresiones probabilísticas estimamos correlaciones entre estas variables y características socioeconómicas de las personas. Las preocupaciones económicas personales son importantes entre Mujeres cabeza de hogar, individuos con personas a cargo, personas recibiendo subsidios y trabajadores informales. Las sociales son más importantes entre mujeres y persona informadas. El cumplimiento de la cuarentena es menor entre jóvenes y mayor entre trabajadores informales. La aprobación del gobierno es menor entre jóvenes, personas recibiendo subsidios y trabajadores informales.
Distributive Politics, Number of Parties, Ideological Polarization, and Bargaining Power
(University of Chicago Press, 2013) Oskar Nupia
We build a theoretical model that provides a previously unexplored way of addressing the spending-negotiation process between a governing party and the parties in a legislature, one that offers new insights as to how political fragmentation, ideological polarization, and bargaining power—as well as their interaction with one another—affect government spending. We show that the effects of both political fragmentation and ideological polarization on government spending are expected to exhibit systematic differences across regimes with different institutional features as pertain to the legislative budgeting process determining the balance of power between the governing party and the legislature. We also show that the effect of political fragmentation on government spending may be intermediated by the degree of ideological polarization. Our results allow us to better understand the existing empirical evidence and suggest new unexplored hypotheses that need to be addressed empirically.
Economic Development: Challenges and Policies (Desarrollo Económico: Retos y Políticas Públicas ) (Spanish)
(2009) Raquel Bernal; Adriana Camacho; Carmen Elisa Flórez Nieto; Christian Jaramillo; Oskar Nupia; Ximena Peña; Catherine Rodriguez; Fabio Sánchez; Miguel Urrutia; Alejandro Gaviría
This study identifies the main problems that Colombia faces and the medium and long term policies that it should follows in order to become a developed country. We concentrate on five relevant elements of development: Education, health and demography, poverty and income distribution, labor market and institutions.
Income Taxation, Political Accountability and the Provision of Public Goods .
(2016) Oskar Nupia
Using an agency-voting model and considering a general tax schedule (linear and non-linear), we analyze whether an increment in taxes (understood as an increment in the marginal income tax rates, or, alternatively, in tax progressivity) positively affects voters' political demands and, consequently, incumbent's effort and the provision of public goods (PG). We find that only under some particular circumstances this outcome can be observed. We characterize the conditions under which an increment in taxes positively affects voters' demands and show that, although increments in these demands are always useful to foster the incumbent's performance, this is not enough to guarantee an increment in the provision of PG and the incumbent's effort. Contingent to observe an increment in voter's demands, the provision of PG increases if either pivotal voter's disposable income is negatively affected by the increment in taxes, or, if this is positively affected, its increment is small enough. Contingent to observe an increment in the provision of PG, the rents extracted by the incumbent (as proportion of tax revenues) decrease if the increment in PG spending is larger than the change in those tax revenues not extracted by the incumbent.
Legislative Fragmentation and Government Spending in Presidential Democracies: Bringing Ideological Polarization into the Picture
(Wiley, 2016) Marcela Eslava; Oskar Nupia
We claim that, in presidential democracies, the effect of increasing fragmentation on government spending should be conditional on polarization, defined as the ideological distance between the government's party and other parties in Congress. We build a model where this result follows from negotiations between the legislature and an independent government seeking the approval of its initiatives—as in presidential democracies. Using cross‐country data over time, we test the empirical validity of our claim finding that, in presidential democracies, there is indeed a positive effect of fragmentation only when polarization is sufficiently high. The same is not true for parliamentary democracies.
<span>The Impact of Massive Protests on Individual Attitudes</span>
(RELX Group (Netherlands), 2024) Andrés Álvarez; Oskar Nupia
Rent Seeking for Pure Public Goods: Wealth and Group's Size Heterogeneity
(Wiley, 2013) Oskar Nupia
We study how between‐group wealth and size asymmetries affect aggregate rent‐seeking efforts when two groups compete for the allocation of a pure public good. Unlike with previous analyses on between‐group asymmetries, we measure the utility cost of rent‐seeking in terms of the loss in private consumption an individual faces when contributing to this activity. Our main result is that fewer between‐group asymmetries do not necessarily imply greater aggregate rent‐seeking efforts. The result is at odds with the commonly held notion that the more homogeneous the contestants in a static rent‐seeking model, the greater the aggregate rent‐seeking efforts.
The Allocation of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Political Motives and Voting Effects
(Penn State University Press, 2018) Oskar Nupia
Abstract This article reports evidence concerning both the political manipulation in the regional allocation of the largest conditional cash transfer program in Colombia, and the political rewards that the incumbent national government obtained in the presidential elections by providing this program. To do this, we use a comprehensive data set for Colombian municipalities during the expansion period of the program between 2005 and 2009. Our evidence shows that, although the incumbent government followed the preestablished criteria for program allocation across municipalities, this manipulated the allocation of subsidies by targeting intensively swing municipalities and less intensively loyal municipalities. Our findings also show that, even after controlling for the effect of the political manipulation of the program on the incumbent vote share, the incumbent national government was politically rewarded by the electorate for providing subsidies through the program. Taken together, our results suggest that voters rewarded the incumbent governing coalition not only for redirecting the subsidies of the program but also for the allocation of subsidies in itself.