Browsing by Autor "Sergio Barbosa"

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Beyond good and bad: Varieties of moral judgment
(2020) William Jiménez‐Leal; Samuel Murray; Santiago Amaya; Sergio Barbosa
We argue that people regularly encounter situations characterized by the presence of moral conflicts among permissible options. These scenarios, which some have called morally charged situations, reflect perceived tensions between moral expectations and moral rights. Studying responses to such situations marks a departure from the common emphasis on sacrificial dilemmas and widespread use of single-dimension measures. In 6 experiments (n=1607), we show that people use a wide conceptual arsenal when assessing actions that can be described as suberogatory (bad but permissible) or supererogatory (good but not required). In Experiment 1 we find that people freely describe actions as suberogatory or supererogatory. Experiment 2 shows that they differentially assess these actions in terms of how permissible, optional, and good they considered them. Experiment 3 tests the use of these evaluative dimensions with sacrificial dilemmas. We found that differences between these categories did not emerge when people respond to dilemmas, even when controlling for trait utilitarian tendencies. By including judgments of blameworthiness and sanction, Experiments 4 and 5 provided additional evidence of the richness sub/super erogatory evaluations. In Experiment 6 people offered their own explanations of their responses. Qualitative analyses revealed that they frequently appeal to character traits, the presence of rights, and the absence of explicit duties. Taken together these results suggest a richer spectrum of both situations and concepts relevant to characterize moral judgment than moral psychologists up to this point have generally recognized. (First three authors contributed equally)
Beyond good and bad: Varieties of moral judgment
(2020) William Jiménez‐Leal; Samuel Murray; Santiago Amaya; Sergio Barbosa
We argue that people regularly encounter situations characterized by the presence of moral conflicts among permissible options. These scenarios, which some have called morally charged situations, reflect perceived tensions between moral expectations and moral rights. Studying responses to such situations marks a departure from the common emphasis on sacrificial dilemmas and widespread use of single-dimension measures. In 6 experiments (n=1607), we show that people use a wide conceptual arsenal when assessing actions that can be described as suberogatory (bad but permissible) or supererogatory (good but not required). In Experiment 1 we find that people freely describe actions as suberogatory or supererogatory. Experiment 2 shows that they differentially assess these actions in terms of how permissible, optional, and good they considered them. Experiment 3 tests the use of these evaluative dimensions with sacrificial dilemmas. We found that differences between these categories did not emerge when people respond to dilemmas, even when controlling for trait utilitarian tendencies. By including judgments of blameworthiness and sanction, Experiments 4 and 5 provided additional evidence of the richness sub/super erogatory evaluations. In Experiment 6 people offered their own explanations of their responses. Qualitative analyses revealed that they frequently appeal to character traits, the presence of rights, and the absence of explicit duties. Taken together these results suggest a richer spectrum of both situations and concepts relevant to characterize moral judgment than moral psychologists up to this point have generally recognized.
Intentions and Behavioural Determinants in the Face of covid-19 Pandemic
(Our Lady of the Rosary University, 2023) Sergio Barbosa; Camilo Andrés Ordóñez Pinilla; Laura León; Andrés David Huerfia Coronado
The containment of Covid 19 implies challenges for governments and health authorities to motivate citizens to adopt several prevention behaviours (i.e., wearing a face mask, washing hands frequently). The purpose of this paper is to identify the factors that motivate people to adopt these behaviours. Our analysis was conducted over data collected by ASCOFAPSI and the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona about attitudes and beliefs related to the pandemic from 919 people from Colombia). The data was collected using a snowball online sampling between May and June 2020. We found that each prevention behaviour is motivated by a different set of factors. Specifically, based on the theory of planned behaviour, our results suggest that the intention to adopt a kind of preventive behaviour is predicted by a set of variables about subjective norms and attitudes as independent variables and a set of variables linked to perceived control as mediator variables. This suggests that the motivation of prevention behaviours from authorities should be particular to each kind of behaviour and consider the associated particular pattern of motivations as well as sociodemographic characteristics and possibilities of action.
It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement
(Cambridge University Press, 2017) Sergio Barbosa; William Jiménez‐Leal
Abstract This study aims to provide evidence about two widely held assumptions in the experimental study of moral judgment. First, that different terms used to ask for moral judgment (e.g., blame, wrongness, permissibility…) can be treated as synonyms and hence used interchangeably. Second, that the moral and legal status of the judged action are independent of one another and thus moral judgment have no influence of legal or other conventional considerations. Previous research shows mixed results on these claims. We recruited 660 participants who provided moral judgment to three identical sacrificial dilemmas using seven different terms. We experimentally manipulated the explicit legal status of the judged action. Results suggest that terms that highlight the utilitarian nature of the judged action cause harsher moral judgments as a mechanism of reputation preservation. Also, the manipulation of the legal status of the judged action holds for all considered terms but is larger for impermissibility judgments. Taken as a whole, our results imply that, although subtle, different terms used to ask for moral judgment have theoretically and methodologically relevant differences which calls for further scrutiny.