Strategic Deference in the Colombian Constitutional Court, 1992–2006

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dc.contributor.authorJuan Carlos Rodríguez‐Raga
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T20:08:06Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T20:08:06Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.descriptionCitaciones: 42
dc.description.abstractWhat determines the level of independence of high courts in presidential democracies? Under what conditions are justices able to make decisions that run against executive preferences in strong Latin American presidencies?
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/cbo9780511976520.004
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511976520.004
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/80190
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.relation.ispartofCambridge University Press eBooks
dc.sourceUniversidad de Los Andes
dc.subjectDeference
dc.subjectPresidential system
dc.subjectIndependence (probability theory)
dc.subjectPolitical science
dc.subjectExecutive power
dc.subjectLatin Americans
dc.subjectLaw
dc.subjectPolitical economy
dc.subjectLaw and economics
dc.titleStrategic Deference in the Colombian Constitutional Court, 1992–2006
dc.typebook-chapter

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