The Weak State Trap

Abstract

Development outcomes come in 'clusters' that seem difficult to exit.Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism.State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to flourish.Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity.We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the micro level.We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing influences.Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops.Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit.