Veneta AndonovaHernando Zuleta2026-03-222026-03-22200910.2202/1554-8597.1149https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-8597.1149https://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/52190Citaciones: 5In many countries governments are helpless to prevent appropriation, whatever the degree of protection promised by the law. In this context, we use a simple model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. We find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. We show that the peaceful equilibrium can be reached if entrepreneurs implement standard remedies for the internal principal-agent problem such as efficiency wages.enAppropriationWageContext (archaeology)Moral hazardCompensation (psychology)EconomicsPrincipal (computer security)Work (physics)Simple (philosophy)Labour economicsarticle