Crop Insurance, Disaster Payments, and Land Use Change: The Effect of Sodsaver on Incentives for Grassland Conversion

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dc.contributor.authorRoger Claassen
dc.contributor.authorJoseph Cooper
dc.contributor.authorFernando Carriazo
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T14:11:10Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T14:11:10Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.descriptionCitaciones: 34
dc.description.abstractSubsidized crop insurance may encourage conversion of native grassland to cropland. The Sodsaver provision of the 2008 farm bill could deny crop insurance on converted land in the Prairie Pothole states for 5 years. Supplemental Revenue Assistance payments, which are linked to crop insurance purchases, could also be withheld. Using representative farms, we estimate that Sodsaver would reduce expected crop revenue by up to 8% and expected net return by up to 20%, while increasing the standard deviation of revenue by as much as 6% of market revenue. Analysis based on elasticities from the literature suggests that Sodsaver would reduce grassland conversion by 9% or less.
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/s1074070800004168
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800004168
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/45037
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Agricultural and Applied Economics
dc.sourceEconomic Research Service
dc.subjectRevenue
dc.subjectCrop insurance
dc.subjectSubsidy
dc.subjectAgricultural economics
dc.subjectPayment
dc.subjectGrassland
dc.subjectIncentive
dc.subjectBusiness
dc.subjectAgriculture
dc.subjectCrop
dc.titleCrop Insurance, Disaster Payments, and Land Use Change: The Effect of Sodsaver on Incentives for Grassland Conversion
dc.typearticle

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