La autoprórroga del Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional: Un desafío al constitucionalismo popular
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Rev. Jur. Der.
Abstract
El artículo analiza la Resolución 4ª de la Declaración Constitucional Plurinacional (DCP) 0049/2023, que establece la prórroga del mandato de las autoridades del Órgano Judicial y del Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, estableciéndose como tesis principal que la autoprórroga realizada por el TCP es inconstitucional y violatoria de diversos principios fundamentales, como la separación de poderes, la independencia judicial, el derecho a la participación política y la transparencia, bajo los argumentos que viola el principio de separación de órganos, porque se arroga funciones del Órgano Legislativo al modificar la Constitución sin ley de por medio; el TCP se convierte en un actor político que busca perpetuarse en el poder, sacrificando su independencia e imparcialidad; los argumentos del TCP en la DCP 0049/2023mson endebles y carecen de base legal; la decisión del TCP debilita la institucionalidad democrática y abre la puerta al abuso de poder; la prórroga es nula por mandato constitucional, ya que el TCP no tiene la potestad de modificar la Constitución; vulnera el principio "Nemo esse iudex in sua causa potest", dado que el TCP no puede ser juez de su propia causa; el TCP solo puede declarar la constitucionalidad o inconstitucionalidad de normas, no legislar; la auto prórroga va en contra de la voluntad del pueblo expresada en la Constitución y en comparación con otros casos de prórroga, la prórroga de los magistrados del Órgano Judicial no se basa en una situación de emergencia como en otros casos. Para ello se han analizado el constitucionalismo popular, como mandato constitucional, que establece que él único intérprete de la Constitución con el poder para reformar la misma es el pueblo, a través de su reforma cuando vulnere principios éticos morales, valores, garantías jurisdiccionales, derechos fundamentales, derechos humanos
The article analyzes Resolution 4 of the Plurinational Constitutional Declaration (DCP) 0049/2023, which establishes the extension of the mandate of the authorities of the Judicial Branch and the Plurinational Constitutional Court, establishing as the main thesis that the self-extension carried out by the TCP is unconstitutional and violative of various fundamental principles, such as the separation of powers, judicial independence, the right to political participation and transparency, under the arguments that it violates the principle of separation of bodies, because it assumes functions of the Legislative Body by modifying the Constitution without law involved; The TCP becomes a political actor that seeks to perpetuate itself in power, sacrificing its independence and impartiality; TCP's arguments in DCP 0049/2023m are weak and lack legal basis; The TCP decision weakens democratic institutions and opens the door to abuse of power; The extension is void by constitutional mandate, since the TCP does not have the power to modify the Constitution; violates the principle "Nemo esse iudex in sua causa potest", given that the TCP cannot be judge of its own case; The TCP can only declare the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of norms, not legislate; The self-extension goes against the will of the people expressed in the Constitution and compared to other cases of extension, the extension of the judges of the Judicial Branch is not based on an emergency situation as in other cases. For this, popular constitutionalism has been analyzed, as a constitutional mandate, which establishes that the only interpreter of the Constitution with the power to reform it is the people, through its reform when it violates moral ethical principles, values, jurisdictional guarantees, rights. fundamental, human rights
The article analyzes Resolution 4 of the Plurinational Constitutional Declaration (DCP) 0049/2023, which establishes the extension of the mandate of the authorities of the Judicial Branch and the Plurinational Constitutional Court, establishing as the main thesis that the self-extension carried out by the TCP is unconstitutional and violative of various fundamental principles, such as the separation of powers, judicial independence, the right to political participation and transparency, under the arguments that it violates the principle of separation of bodies, because it assumes functions of the Legislative Body by modifying the Constitution without law involved; The TCP becomes a political actor that seeks to perpetuate itself in power, sacrificing its independence and impartiality; TCP's arguments in DCP 0049/2023m are weak and lack legal basis; The TCP decision weakens democratic institutions and opens the door to abuse of power; The extension is void by constitutional mandate, since the TCP does not have the power to modify the Constitution; violates the principle "Nemo esse iudex in sua causa potest", given that the TCP cannot be judge of its own case; The TCP can only declare the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of norms, not legislate; The self-extension goes against the will of the people expressed in the Constitution and compared to other cases of extension, the extension of the judges of the Judicial Branch is not based on an emergency situation as in other cases. For this, popular constitutionalism has been analyzed, as a constitutional mandate, which establishes that the only interpreter of the Constitution with the power to reform it is the people, through its reform when it violates moral ethical principles, values, jurisdictional guarantees, rights. fundamental, human rights
Description
Vol. 13, No. 21