Oligopsony and Minimum Wages

dc.contributor.authorHernán Vallejo
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T19:35:51Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T19:35:51Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractThis article presents a model of oligopsony. It considers different conjectural variations that cover the whole range between the extreme cases of monopsony and perfect competition, such as Collusion, Threat, Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand, and compares them in terms of prices, quantities, profits, markdown, price elasticity of supply and welfare. It also considers the impact of minimum wages, under the different conjectures analyzed.
dc.identifier.doi10.15446/ede.v34n65.110347
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.15446/ede.v34n65.110347
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/76985
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofEnsayos de Economía
dc.sourceUniversidad de Los Andes
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectLabour economics
dc.titleOligopsony and Minimum Wages
dc.typearticle

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