An Objection to Paul’s Reading on Christianity

dc.contributor.authorJalal Peykani
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T16:25:00Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T16:25:00Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.descriptionCitaciones: 1
dc.description.abstractThe classical problem of induction is one of the very known forms of Skepticism, which many philosophers have tried to solve or resolve it. Some epistemologists believe that Externalism could be used as a good approach to resolve the problem. They claim that ‘Process reliabilism’, the most important externalist theory, is less vulnerable to Skepticism than other theories, because of its epistemological fallibilism, and also taking modest and weak criteria to acquire knowledge. In this paper we will argue that externalist theories, including Process reliabilism, presuppose induction, so such theories don’t have considerable capabilities to solve or resolve the problem.
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/58111
dc.language.isoen
dc.sourceNur University
dc.subjectExternalism
dc.subjectSkepticism
dc.subjectEpistemology
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subjectInternalism and externalism
dc.titleAn Objection to Paul’s Reading on Christianity
dc.typearticle

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