AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF PATENT HOLDUP

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dc.contributor.authorAlexander Galetovic
dc.contributor.authorStephen Haber
dc.contributor.authorRoss Levine
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T13:56:07Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T13:56:07Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.descriptionCitaciones: 64
dc.description.abstractA large theoretical literature asserts that standard-essential patents (SEPs) allow their owners to "hold up" innovation by charging fees that exceed their incremental contribution to a final product. We evaluate two central, interrelated predictions of this SEP holdup hypothesis: (1) SEP-reliant industries should experience more stagnant quality-adjusted prices than non-SEP-reliant industries; and (2) court decisions that reduce the excessive power of SEP holders should accelerate innovation in SEP-reliant industries. We find no empirical support for either prediction. Indeed, SEP-reliant industries have the fastest quality-adjusted price declines in the U.S. economy.
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/joclec/nhv024
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhv024
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/43579
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Competition Law & Economics
dc.sourceNational Bureau of Economic Research
dc.subjectEmpirical examination
dc.subjectQuality (philosophy)
dc.subjectProduct (mathematics)
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectEmpirical research
dc.subjectIndustrial organization
dc.subjectEmpirical evidence
dc.subjectBusiness
dc.subjectEconometrics
dc.titleAN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF PATENT HOLDUP
dc.typearticle

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