Diseño institucional e incentivos implícitos en la descentralización boliviana
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Abstract
Se utiliza el enfoque de segunda generación de descentralización fiscal como referencia para establecer las características del diseño de la institucionalidad política y fiscal de la descentralización boliviana y su evolución. Se utilizan datos hasta 2008 de las finanzas públicas subnacionales para verificar en lo fiscal que la descentralización del gasto fue mayor que la del ingreso, estableciendo un contexto de desbalance fiscal vertical que fue creciente por el aumento de las transferencias fiscales durante el periodo de auge. Tal contexto establece que el superávit fiscal subnacional experimentado no fue por eficiencia interna sino por ingresos excesivos provenientes de dichas transferencias. Se estimaron modelos de panel para identificar y evaluar los incentivos implícitos contenidos en la institucionalidad fiscal de la descentralización. En el ámbito municipal se encuentra: (i) desalineamiento del gasto local con los intereses locales por dominancia de los ingresos no propios (transferencias) sobre los propios (dominancia de las políticas de desarrollo del Gobierno central); (ii) incentivo a gastar ingresos no propios más rápidamente que los propios (efecto flypaper); (iii) mayor contribución marginal de ingresos propios a saldos fiscales positivos que de ingresos no propios, generándose así la semilla de presupuesto flexible (soft budget problem), pero oculto por el superávit fiscal; (iv) desincentivo a la generación de ingresos propios (tributarios y no tributarios) por efecto de la magnitud y crecimiento de los no propios (desincentivo a la cultura de aporte propio). En el ámbito prefectural se encontró: (i) desalineamiento con los intereses regionales por predominancia de los ingresos no propios (transferencias), al no existir acceso a impuestos propios; (ii) tendencia potencial al problema de presupuesto flexible y salvataje fiscal (bail out) también oculto por el superávit fiscal; (iii) solo dos departamentos generaron impuestos de nivel nacional mayores a las transferencias que recibieron; (iv) desincentivo a pagar el impuesto nacional IVA a causa de mayores transferencias por regalías, efecto no extendido a otros impuestos nacionales; (v) dependencia y riesgo fiscal frente a la disminución de precios y volumen de producción de hidrocarburos debido a la volatilidad de precios del petróleo. En términos de resultados se encontró impacto favorable y significativo de la descentralización sobre indicadores de educación, que fue objetivo de desarrollo del Gobierno central.
The second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) approach is used as a reference to analyze the political and fiscal institutional design of Bolivia's decentralization model and its evolution. Subnational public finance data up to 2008 is used to verify that decentralization of expenditure was higher than that of revenue, establishing a context of vertical fiscal imbalance that increased due to growing fiscal transfers during the positive external shock (boom) period. Consequently, the subnational fiscal surplus was not a result of internal efficiency but of excess revenues from such transfers. Panel models were estimated to identify and assess the implicit incentives embedded in fiscal institutions of the decentralization model. Findings at the municipal level are: i) misalignment of local spendingwith local interests due to dominance of transfers over own revenue (dominance of central government development policies); ii) incentive to spend transfers faster than own revenue (flypaper effect); iii) greater marginal contribution of own revenue to positive fiscal balances compared to transfers, thus introducing the seed for a soft budget constraint but hidden by the fiscal surplus; iv) disincentive to generate own revenue (tax and non-tax) due to the size and growth of transfers (disincentive to the culture of contributing to own revenue). Findings at the prefectural¹ level are: i) misalignment with regional interests given the dominance of transfers over own revenue due to absolute lack of tax powers (until 2009); ii) high tendency to a soft budget constraint and, eventually, also fiscal bail-out, hidden by the fiscal surplus; iii) in only two departments collection of national-level taxes were higher, compared to transfers received in the same departments; iv) disincentive to pay the VAT (national-level tax) due to higher royalty transfers received, an effect not extended to other national-level taxes; v) high dependence from hydrocarbon-based transfers, and fiscal risk when this natural resource declines (both in volume and prices) due to volatility of international oil prices. Also, as a result of the decentralization model a positive and significant impact was found on education-coverage indicators, an important development objective of the national government.
The second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) approach is used as a reference to analyze the political and fiscal institutional design of Bolivia's decentralization model and its evolution. Subnational public finance data up to 2008 is used to verify that decentralization of expenditure was higher than that of revenue, establishing a context of vertical fiscal imbalance that increased due to growing fiscal transfers during the positive external shock (boom) period. Consequently, the subnational fiscal surplus was not a result of internal efficiency but of excess revenues from such transfers. Panel models were estimated to identify and assess the implicit incentives embedded in fiscal institutions of the decentralization model. Findings at the municipal level are: i) misalignment of local spendingwith local interests due to dominance of transfers over own revenue (dominance of central government development policies); ii) incentive to spend transfers faster than own revenue (flypaper effect); iii) greater marginal contribution of own revenue to positive fiscal balances compared to transfers, thus introducing the seed for a soft budget constraint but hidden by the fiscal surplus; iv) disincentive to generate own revenue (tax and non-tax) due to the size and growth of transfers (disincentive to the culture of contributing to own revenue). Findings at the prefectural¹ level are: i) misalignment with regional interests given the dominance of transfers over own revenue due to absolute lack of tax powers (until 2009); ii) high tendency to a soft budget constraint and, eventually, also fiscal bail-out, hidden by the fiscal surplus; iii) in only two departments collection of national-level taxes were higher, compared to transfers received in the same departments; iv) disincentive to pay the VAT (national-level tax) due to higher royalty transfers received, an effect not extended to other national-level taxes; v) high dependence from hydrocarbon-based transfers, and fiscal risk when this natural resource declines (both in volume and prices) due to volatility of international oil prices. Also, as a result of the decentralization model a positive and significant impact was found on education-coverage indicators, an important development objective of the national government.
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No. 19