The Role of Information in Collective Decisions

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dc.contributor.authorNicolás Figueroa
dc.contributor.authorJosé-Alberto Guerra
dc.contributor.authorFrancisco Silva
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T20:02:07Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T20:02:07Z
dc.date.issued2026
dc.description.abstractAbstract We study how members of a group vote for public information. We argue, both theoretically and experimentally, that voters are more likely to vote for information to be acquired relative to their own individual willingness to pay for information when ex-ante disagreement is higher and ex-post disagreement is lower. Ex-ante and ex-post disagreement refer to the disagreement among group members over the best policy for the group to follow before and after information is acquired, respectively. We discuss how the results inform the debate over the role of the State in fostering progress, and the value of the wisdom of the crowd.
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/jeea/jvag001
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvag001
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/79596
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of the European Economic Association
dc.sourcePontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
dc.subjectValue (mathematics)
dc.subjectState (computer science)
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectPublic good
dc.subjectPublic information
dc.subjectPublic economics
dc.subjectMicroeconomics
dc.subjectValue of information
dc.subjectGroup (periodic table)
dc.subjectPublic policy
dc.titleThe Role of Information in Collective Decisions
dc.typearticle

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