The Colombian Paradox: Peace Processes, Elite Divisions & Popular Plebiscites (Online Appendix)

dc.contributor.authorAila M. Matanock
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Sánchez, Miguel
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T20:55:39Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T20:55:39Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.abstract"Ending civil conflict is difficult, particularly through political settlements. Conflicts now often occur in states with elections, and voters have sometimes been directly involved in the process, potentially in efforts to overcome elite divisions. Yet, according to evidence from the 2016 popular plebiscite in Colombia, referendums and other tools of direct approval by voters seem to amplify elite divisions and therefore are not a useful mechanism to strengthen peace processes in this way. Focusing instead on traditional elite-led negotiations that seek to satisfy each faction may have a better chance of producing signed settlements, although the Colombian case also suggests some alternative forms of inclusivity that may help increase the overall legitimacy of the process and improve the odds of implementation."
dc.identifier.doi10.7910/dvn/dum2hh
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.7910/dvn/dum2hh
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/84897
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherHarvard University
dc.relation.ispartofHarvard Dataverse
dc.sourceUniversity of California, Berkeley
dc.subjectElite
dc.subjectAppendix
dc.subjectGeography
dc.subjectPolitical science
dc.titleThe Colombian Paradox: Peace Processes, Elite Divisions & Popular Plebiscites (Online Appendix)
dc.typedataset

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