The Rise and Persistence of Illegal Crops: Evidence from a Naive Policy Announcement
| dc.contributor.author | Mounu Prem | |
| dc.contributor.author | Juan F. Vargas | |
| dc.contributor.author | Daniel Mejía | |
| dc.coverage.spatial | Bolivia | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-03-22T20:41:47Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-03-22T20:41:47Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.description | Citaciones: 9 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Policies based on prohibition and repression to fight the war on drugs have largely failed in a variety of contexts. However, incentive-based policies may also fail and have unintended negative consequences if policymakers do not properly anticipate behavioral reactions. This is a particularly important concern in the case of policies announced prior to their implementation. In this paper, we show that a naive and untimely policy announcement generated an unprecedented escalation in cocaine production in Colombia, offsetting almost 20 years and billions of dollars of U.S.-backed efforts to stop drug production and cartel action. | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.31235/osf.io/6gmpd | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/6gmpd | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/83532 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.source | Universidad del Rosario | |
| dc.subject | Incentive | |
| dc.subject | Unintended consequences | |
| dc.subject | Cartel | |
| dc.subject | Variety (cybernetics) | |
| dc.subject | Persistence (discontinuity) | |
| dc.subject | Production (economics) | |
| dc.subject | Action (physics) | |
| dc.subject | Business | |
| dc.subject | Economics | |
| dc.subject | Public economics | |
| dc.title | The Rise and Persistence of Illegal Crops: Evidence from a Naive Policy Announcement | |
| dc.type | preprint |