Replication Data for: Public Reactions to Non-Compliance with Judicial Orders

Abstract

Constitutions empower people to ask judges for binding orders directing state agents to remedy rights violations, but state agents do not always comply. Scholars propose that by making it easier to observe non-compliance, courts can leverage public pressure for compliance when it exists. Yet, exposure to information about non-compliance might lead individuals to accept high levels of non-compliance and reduce support for judicial remedies. We estimate the rate of non-compliance with judges' orders via a rigorous tracking study of the Colombian tutela. We then embed this rate in three survey experiments fielded with online national quota samples. We show that people find the non-compliance rate in the tutela highly unacceptable regardless of a variety of mitigating factors. We also show that public reactions to this information depends on prior expectations, a finding that stresses the importance of scholarship in cognitive psychology for studies of compliance in law and politics.