Real Exchange Rate Targeting: ¿Trilema Monetario o Control de Capitales? La Política Fiscal

dc.contributor.authorJavier Gerardo Milei
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T17:07:18Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T17:07:18Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.description.abstractThe paper shows that the impossibility to reach a real exchange ratetarget, as proposed by the "Monetary Trilemma" can be circumvented byadding one policy instrument. In the choice between countercyclical fiscalpolicy and control of capital movements, the first one appears as thepreferred option, since it provides a stable equilibrium. Not only anequilibrium is not achieved in the second case, but the restrictions tocapital movements in an economy whith a low level of capitalization doesnot look like a sensible choice.
dc.identifier.doi10.55444/2451.7321.2004.v42.n2.3807
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.55444/2451.7321.2004.v42.n2.3807
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/62295
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofRevista de Economía y Estadística
dc.sourceUniversidad de Los Andes
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectHumanities
dc.titleReal Exchange Rate Targeting: ¿Trilema Monetario o Control de Capitales? La Política Fiscal
dc.typearticle

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