Screening of Informed and Uninformed Experts

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dc.contributor.authorJorge Barreras
dc.contributor.authorÁlvaro Riascos
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T20:46:06Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T20:46:06Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.abstractTesting the validity of claims made by self-proclaimed experts can be impossible when testing them in isolation, even with infinite observations at the disposal of the tester. However, in a multiple expert setting it is possible to design a contract that only informed experts accept and uninformed experts reject. The tester can pit competing forecasts of future events against each other and take advantage of the uncertainty experts have about the other experts' knowledge. This contract will work even when there is only a single data point to evaluate.
dc.identifier.doi10.48550/arxiv.1912.06244
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1912.06244
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/83954
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherCornell University
dc.relation.ispartofarXiv (Cornell University)
dc.sourceUniversity of Pennsylvania
dc.subjectIsolation (microbiology)
dc.subjectPoint (geometry)
dc.subjectWork (physics)
dc.subjectTest (biology)
dc.subjectComputer science
dc.subjectSingle point
dc.subjectActuarial science
dc.subjectRisk analysis (engineering)
dc.subjectOperations research
dc.subjectBusiness
dc.titleScreening of Informed and Uninformed Experts
dc.typepreprint

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