Instituciones políticas y presupuesto público : el caso de Colombia, 1990-2003

dc.contributor.authorNestor Rubiano
dc.contributor.authorLuis Mario López
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T15:42:56Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T15:42:56Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.descriptionCitaciones: 7
dc.description.abstractThis essay links empirical evidence of public budgets with some political habits (informal institutions) in Colombia. The first part is theoretical and fixes the concepts of institutions, fiscal rules and clientelism. The second reviews some empirical studies which connect colonial institutions and economic performance. In section three, budget statistics are presented in support of hypotheses about political logics that conduct the deals in Colombian Congress. Finally, we evaluate the consequences of this political game on budget objectives.
dc.identifier.doi10.32468/espe.4602
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.32468/espe.4602
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/53986
dc.language.isoes
dc.publisherCIG Media Group
dc.relation.ispartofEnsayos sobre Política Económica
dc.sourceUniversidad de Los Andes
dc.subjectPolitical science
dc.titleInstituciones políticas y presupuesto público : el caso de Colombia, 1990-2003
dc.typearticle

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