Herding in equity crowdfunding

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dc.contributor.authorThomas B. Åstebro
dc.contributor.authorManuel Fernández Sierra
dc.contributor.authorStefano Lovo
dc.contributor.authorNir Vulkan
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T14:16:27Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T14:16:27Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.descriptionCitaciones: 20
dc.description.abstractAbstract We build a model of equity crowdfunding that incorporates the two major funding models: all‐or‐nothing (AoN) and keep‐it‐all (KIA). Both informed and uninformed investors arrive sequentially and rationally choose whether and how much to invest. The KIA solution turns out to be a reduced version of AoN without signalling. We test predictions using data from a leading European equity crowdfunding platform and find support. Results are consistent with rational information aggregation. However, negative information cascades may still appear. The AoN crowdfunding mechanism might therefore fail to finance a nonnegligible percentage of positive NPV projects.
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1756-2171.12474
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12474
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/45552
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.relation.ispartofThe RAND Journal of Economics
dc.sourceUniversidad de Los Andes
dc.subjectHerding
dc.subjectEquity (law)
dc.subjectBusiness
dc.subjectEquity crowdfunding
dc.subjectFinancial system
dc.subjectFinance
dc.titleHerding in equity crowdfunding
dc.typearticle

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