Razón práctica y primer principio de la ley natural en Suárez

dc.contributor.authorSebastián Contreras
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T17:56:15Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T17:56:15Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.abstractPractical reason and first principle of the natural law in SuárezThe aim of this paper is to examine the Suarecian theory of practical reason and its first principle, which is also the first principle of natural law. Although our main source is Suarez’s De anima, other texts are used as well, including De legibus ac Deo legislatore and Disputationes metaphysicae, wherein the Jesuit author introduces some relevant insights about the first principle of natural law. This paper attempts to show that Suarecian practical reason operates independently of speculative reason (because both have their own first principles) and that natural law is a norm of reason, i.e., a practical and directive principle of human actions.
dc.identifier.doi10.12775/setf.2017.008
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2017.008
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/67137
dc.language.isoes
dc.publisherNicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
dc.relation.ispartofScientia et Fides
dc.sourceUniversidad de Los Andes
dc.subjectNatural law
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subjectNatural (archaeology)
dc.subjectNorm (philosophy)
dc.subjectDirective
dc.subjectLaw
dc.subjectHumanities
dc.subjectEpistemology
dc.titleRazón práctica y primer principio de la ley natural en Suárez
dc.typearticle

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