LA ACCIÓN MORAL. CONTRASTE ENTRE LAS EXPLICACIONES MOTIVACIONALES DADAS POR LA FILOSOFÍA Y LA PSICOLOGÍA

dc.contributor.authorVillegas de Posada María Cristina
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T15:48:46Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T15:48:46Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.descriptionCitaciones: 3
dc.description.abstractThe question about why we act morally, has been answered by philosophy as well as by psychology. Philosophy offers explanations that could be grouped in three types of positions: a) internalism or rationalism, derived from Kant; b) externalism or emotivism, derived from Hume; c) combination of positions. These positions are also present in psychology, although c) predominates.A critical analysis of the suppositions underlying the different positions, as well as the empirical evidence in morality and related fields of psychology, allows us to reject the first two positions in favor of the third.
dc.identifier.doi10.7440/res18.2004.02
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.7440/res18.2004.02
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/54556
dc.language.isoes
dc.publisherUniversidad de Los Andes
dc.relation.ispartofRevista de Estudios Sociales
dc.sourceUniversidad de Los Andes
dc.subjectInternalism and externalism
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subjectMorality
dc.subjectHumanities
dc.subjectEpistemology
dc.subjectRationalism
dc.titleLA ACCIÓN MORAL. CONTRASTE ENTRE LAS EXPLICACIONES MOTIVACIONALES DADAS POR LA FILOSOFÍA Y LA PSICOLOGÍA
dc.typearticle

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