On Scheler’s Affective Intentionality

dc.contributor.authorJ. Edward Hackett
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T17:55:37Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T17:55:37Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.abstractThe following essay was first given as a virtual lecture on April 12, 2018 to La Salle University. The scope of the lecture was expository and had two aims. First, I explained how Scheler’s affective intentionality undergirds moral theorizing. Second, I explained Scheler’s value rankings disclosed in affective intentionality. Overall, I hoped to convey to the audience how unique Scheler’s position in the history of ethics is.
dc.identifier.doi10.26457/recein.v13i49.1761
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.26457/recein.v13i49.1761
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/67074
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofRevista del Centro de Investigación de la Universidad la Salle
dc.sourceUniversidad La Salle
dc.subjectIntentionality
dc.subjectValue (mathematics)
dc.subjectEpistemology
dc.subjectScope (computer science)
dc.subjectPsychology
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subjectPsychoanalysis
dc.subjectSocial psychology
dc.titleOn Scheler’s Affective Intentionality
dc.typearticle

Files