The Rise and Persistence of Illegal Crops: Evidence from a Naive Policy Announcement

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorMounu Prem
dc.contributor.authorJuan F. Vargas
dc.contributor.authorDaniel Mejía
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T14:38:31Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T14:38:31Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.descriptionCitaciones: 14
dc.description.abstractAbstract Policies based on prohibition and repression to fight the war on drugs have largely failed in a variety of contexts. However, incentive-based policies may also fail and have unintended negative consequences if policymakers do not properly anticipate behavioral reactions. This is an particularly important concern in the case of policies announced prior to their implementation. In this paper, we show that a naive and untimely policy announcement generated an unprecedented escalation in cocaine production in Colombia, offsetting almost 20 years and billions of dollars of U.S.-backed efforts to stop drug production and cartel action.
dc.identifier.doi10.1162/rest_a_01059
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01059
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/47698
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherThe MIT Press
dc.relation.ispartofThe Review of Economics and Statistics
dc.sourceUniversidad del Rosario
dc.subjectIncentive
dc.subjectUnintended consequences
dc.subjectCartel
dc.subjectVariety (cybernetics)
dc.subjectProduction (economics)
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectPersistence (discontinuity)
dc.subjectAction (physics)
dc.subjectBusiness
dc.subjectPublic economics
dc.titleThe Rise and Persistence of Illegal Crops: Evidence from a Naive Policy Announcement
dc.typearticle

Files

Collections

Artículo Científico Publicado