Colluding Against Environmental Regulation

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dc.contributor.authorJorge Alé‐Chilet
dc.contributor.authorCuicui Chen
dc.contributor.authorJing Li
dc.contributor.authorMathias Reynaert
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T20:41:48Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T20:41:48Z
dc.date.issued2025
dc.descriptionCitaciones: 8
dc.description.abstractAbstract We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by violating jointly. We consider a case of three German automakers colluding to reduce the effectiveness of emissions control technology. By estimating a structural model of the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018, we find that collusion lowers expected noncompliance penalties substantially and increases buyer and producer surplus. Due to increased pollution, welfare decreases by € 1.57–5.57 billion. We show how environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in preventing noncompliance.
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/restud/rdaf024
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf024
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/83533
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.relation.ispartofThe Review of Economic Studies
dc.sourceUniversidad de Los Andes
dc.subjectEuros
dc.subjectCollusion
dc.subjectDamages
dc.subjectBusiness
dc.subjectWelfare
dc.subjectProduction (economics)
dc.subjectPollution
dc.subjectNatural resource economics
dc.subjectIndustrial organization
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleColluding Against Environmental Regulation
dc.typepreprint

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