El uso de incentivos para controlar la deforestación en la región Amazonia-Andina: perspectivas desde estudios de campo de los costos de oportunidad
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rlde
Abstract
Este artículo utiliza información socioeconómica y física de más de 500 propiedades en tres países andinos para estimar las curvas de oferta de tierras para la conservación a través de programas de incentivos. También evalúa el impacto esperado de un programa de incentivos básico y propuestas de mejorar este diseño. Los resultados muestran dos desafíos básicos. Primero, un gran porcentaje del paisaje seguirá forestado en el mediano plazo independientemente de cualquier incentivo. Segundo, los propietarios atribuyen un valor a la tierra que planean deforestar mayor al pago ofrecido por los programas de incentivos existentes. Encontramos la potencial para reducir significativamente el costo de evitar la deforestación a través de: 1) concentrar las operaciones en regiones con mayores tasas de deforestación, 2) focalizar en regiones con actividades menos rentables, y 3) excluir de los contratos las áreas de menor probabilidad de ser deforestadas.
This paper uses a property-level dataset of socio-economic and physical information from more than 500 properties in three Andean countries to estimate supply curves of land for conservation via incentive programs. We also evaluate the expected impact of a basic incentive payments program and several proposed improvements in design. We find that the distribution and magnitude of opportunity costs present two challenges. First, a large percentage of the landscape will remain forested in the medium term independent of any incentive. Second, landowners likely place a value on land they plan to clear that significantly exceeds the payment offered by existing incentive programs. We find significant potential to reduce the cost of avoiding deforestation through 1) focusing operations on regions with higher deforestation rates, 2) targeting regions and actors who clear for less profitable activities, and 3) excluding from contracts those areas that are less likely to be cleared.
This paper uses a property-level dataset of socio-economic and physical information from more than 500 properties in three Andean countries to estimate supply curves of land for conservation via incentive programs. We also evaluate the expected impact of a basic incentive payments program and several proposed improvements in design. We find that the distribution and magnitude of opportunity costs present two challenges. First, a large percentage of the landscape will remain forested in the medium term independent of any incentive. Second, landowners likely place a value on land they plan to clear that significantly exceeds the payment offered by existing incentive programs. We find significant potential to reduce the cost of avoiding deforestation through 1) focusing operations on regions with higher deforestation rates, 2) targeting regions and actors who clear for less profitable activities, and 3) excluding from contracts those areas that are less likely to be cleared.
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No. 30