Building Trust? Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Social Capital*

dc.contributor.authorOrazio Attanasio
dc.contributor.authorLuca Pellerano
dc.contributor.authorSandra Polanía-Reyes
dc.coverage.spatialBolivia
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-22T14:05:59Z
dc.date.available2026-03-22T14:05:59Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.descriptionCitaciones: 56
dc.description.abstractAbstract In this paper, we propose a measure of social capital based on behaviour in a public goods game. We conducted a public goods game within 28 groups in two similar neighbourhoods in Cartagena, Colombia, one of which had been targeted for over two years by a conditional cash transfer programme that has an important social component. The level of cooperation we observe in the ‘treatment’ community is considerably higher than that in the ‘control’ community. The two neighbourhoods, however, although similar in many dimensions, turn out to be significantly different in other observable variables. The result we obtain in terms of cooperation, however, is robust to controls for these observable differences. We also compare our measure of social capital with other more traditional measures that have been used in the literature.
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1475-5890.2009.00092.x
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2009.00092.x
dc.identifier.urihttps://andeanlibrary.org/handle/123456789/44536
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.relation.ispartofFiscal Studies
dc.sourceUniversity College London
dc.subjectPublic good
dc.subjectSocial capital
dc.subjectPublic goods game
dc.subjectConditional cash transfer
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectCapital (architecture)
dc.subjectCash
dc.subjectMeasure (data warehouse)
dc.subjectPublic economics
dc.subjectControl (management)
dc.titleBuilding Trust? Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Social Capital*
dc.typearticle

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