El problema de los derechos sociales: la igualdad como condición de la libertad. Un estudio del caso chileno
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Rev. Jur. Der.
Abstract
Sostendremos que el ordenamiento chileno se caracteriza por tomar partido por un modelo institucional que se fundamenta en una cierta concepción de la libertad, y que ve con desconfianza, cualquier intento por avanzar hacia una distribución más igualitaria de los bienes y los derechos. A continuación, probaremos que esta visión es problemática, puesto que genera importantes desigualdades en el goce de las garantías fundamentales, y en las posibilidades que tienen las personas para poder desarrollar libremente sus planes de vida. En este sentido, sostendremos la tesis relativa a que la libertad debe entenderse de una forma más robusta, esto como capacidad para la autonomía. Esta propuesta permite dar cuenta del hecho que la igualdad en realidad no constituye un principio que lesione la libertad, sino que, por el contrario, representa uno de sus presupuestos.
We will argüe that the Chilean system is characterized by taking sides with an institutional model that is based on a certain conception of freedom, that sees with suspicion, any attempt to move towards a more egalitarian distribution of goods and rights. Next, we will prove that this visión is problematic, since it generates important inequalities in the enjoyment of fundamental guarantees, and in the possibilities that people have to freely develop their life plans. We will finish the work, supporting the thesis that freedom should be understood in a more robust way, this as a capacity forautonomy. This proposal allows usto account for the fact that equalitydoes not really constitute a principie that harms freedom, but, on the contrary, represents one of its budgets.
We will argüe that the Chilean system is characterized by taking sides with an institutional model that is based on a certain conception of freedom, that sees with suspicion, any attempt to move towards a more egalitarian distribution of goods and rights. Next, we will prove that this visión is problematic, since it generates important inequalities in the enjoyment of fundamental guarantees, and in the possibilities that people have to freely develop their life plans. We will finish the work, supporting the thesis that freedom should be understood in a more robust way, this as a capacity forautonomy. This proposal allows usto account for the fact that equalitydoes not really constitute a principie that harms freedom, but, on the contrary, represents one of its budgets.
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Vol. 9, No. 13